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The African Capacity Building Foundation 
 
 
ACBF is Africa’s premier institution in Capacity Building. Established in February 1991, ACBF is 
the outcome of collaboration between African governments and the international donor community. 
The major sponsoring agencies of the Foundation are the African Development Bank (AfDB), the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) became a member of ACBF in September 2002.  
 
ACBF’s mission is to build sustainable human and institutional capacity for sustainable growth, 
poverty reduction and good governance on Africa. The Foundation intervenes in six core 
competency areas, namely, economic policy analysis and management, financial management and 
accountability, strengthening and monitoring of national statistics, public administration and 
management, strengthening of the policy analysis capacity of national parliaments, 
professionalization of the voices of the private sector and civil society.  
 
Besides intervening directly in the area of capacity building, ACBF also provides a platform for 
consultation, dialogue, cooperation as well as information and knowledge sharing amongst 
development stakeholders and partners across the African continent. 
 
The Foundation is present in some 40 African countries in sub-Saharan Africa and has committed 
more than US$350 million to interventions in capacity building since its inception.  
 
 
The ACBF Development Memoirs Series 
 
ACBF’s Development Memoirs Series is a key instrument in the Foundation’s knowledge 
management strategy aimed at harnessing the know-how and learned experiences of eminent senior 
policymakers and development managers. Central to the Series is the understanding that knowledge 
management tools and practices can be effectively employed to leverage both local and externally 
generated knowledge to bridge the knowledge gap between sub-Saharan Africa and the developed 
world. 
 
The Development Memoirs Series, which is generated through contributions by from the ACBF 
Senior Policymakers and Development Managers Knowledge Sharing Program (SPM-KSP) provides 
professional insights, reflections, skills, processes and experiences in the management of specific 
policies and programs, and offer case studies on processes, practices and experiences associated with 
specific policies and programs that made measurable impact on the continent’s development 
experience. The individual voices captured via the SPM-KSP collectively contribute to enhancing the 
effectiveness of the Foundation’s operations, identifying learning and knowledge-sharing 
opportunities, and providing practitioners with guideposts to best practices in policymaking and 
development program management.  
 
The Development Memoirs Series reflects the Foundation’s vision and quest to actively embrace a 
diversity of knowledge sources and knowledge including the ways gender, values and culture 
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influence the generation, sharing and application of knowledge. The Series speaks to ACBF’s vision 
that the creation, sharing and deployment of cutting edge knowledge in an increasingly complex, 
competitive and changing world, is imperative to Africa’s current development efforts and future 
prospects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge Management Department 
The African Capacity Building Foundation 
7th, 14th & 15th Floors, ZB Life Towers 
Cnr. Jason Moyo/Sam Nujoma Avenue 
P.O. Box 1562 
Harare, Zimbabwe 
 
June 2008 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
Development assistance has been of benefit to developing countries over the years. It has helped to 
build physical infrastructural, human and institutional capacities and deliver some level of growth in 
recipient countries. Through civil society organizations, it has been instrumental in raising voices on the 
need for good governance, to stem the tide of corruption and promote development effectiveness of 
both aid and domestic resources.  
 
Development assistance has equally had its negative results list.  Traditional technical assistance has 
tended to supplant local capacity, undermine local knowledge and institutions and render recipient 
countries more vulnerable and dependent on aid.  Reasons for these shortcomings are legion. Donor-
driven projects are not derived from aid recipients' development priorities and are an expression of an 
attitude by donors that "they know better', "they lecture and recipients listen", "they give and poor 
countries receive", "they know and recipient countries learn", "they take care of things, because poor 
countries cannot"... Hence, as it was once said, when a professional from a donor country moves into a 
recipient country he/she is seen as an expert, but when a professional from a recipient country moves 
into a donor country, he/she is seen as an immigrant. 
 
These and numerous other factors explain why aid has not succeeded in delivering development results 
in recipient countries.  Trade is very important for poor countries.  Yet, aid, because of donors' vested 
interest and recipients' development weaknesses remains a hugely attractive industry delivering billions of 
dollars annually to sub-Saharan Africa without tangible results.  In spite of this, Africans are not speaking 
out loud and strong enough on the need for reforms to make aid deliver results.  They are also not 
raising their voices effectively enough to deal with distortions in trade.  For instance, disbursement of 
resources on commitments made by the G8 at its Summit in Glenn Eagles, Scotland in July 2005 is 
virtually zero and the European Union Economic Partnership Agreements are questionable. In 
summary, it is fair to note that: 
 
 Aid that undermines recipient's capacity and sense of ownership of policies and programs cannot 
support sustainable growth. It perpetuates dependence. 
 African countries, leaders and professionals are not speaking out enough in support of aid 
reforms. Their reticence weakens efforts by development cooperation ministers in donor 
countries who stand against vested interests that are paid out of ODA budget, and who seek 
reform to aid delivery mechanisms. 
 Billions of dollars are still spent on expatriate staff and their perquisites. African governments 
should learn to say "No" to supply-driven and tied aid.  They should also say "No" when doing 
business with a particular donor is just too costly.  
 Governments, policies and institutions must work in Africa and citizens should be empowered 
to hold their governments accountable for results.  This is the essence of democracy. Capacity of 
parliaments and civil society organizations needs to be stepped up to promote accountability by 
the governments. This will remain a vital area for intervention in capacity building. 
 Mutual accountability between donor and recipient countries should be encouraged and the 
existing platform or mechanism strengthened. 
 The Doha Development Agenda on trade is not delivering results. Distortions in trade in 
agriculture are still a major challenge. Until rich countries open up their markets and reform their 
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agricultural policies, success in achieving MDG 1 on poverty and hunger in African countries 
will remain a mirage. Rich countries' agricultural subsidies are an unfair trade practice. They are 
crowding out African farmers and destroying the livelihoods of small producers. 
 African countries should strive to earn their external resources on the international market than 
endure endless lectures by World Bank and IMF officials as well by Development Cooperation 
Ministers from rich countries. Many African governments are still too focused on maximizing 
aid than trade opportunities. 
 African governments are not speaking out loud and hard enough on trade issues. Trade is more 
important than aid. Poor countries still have very weak capacity for trade negotiations. This is a 
critical area for intervention in capacity building. For instance, not enough negotiations have 
gone into the Economic Partnership Agreements. These Agreements in the African context 
should: 
 
o Yield to intra-African integration.  
o Abstain from pushing Singapore or WTO-plus issues, which have the effect of creating 
burdensome obligations and distracting from or leading to inconsistency with 
development priorities. 
o Not demand reciprocity, as there are attendant trade-adjustment costs to African 
countries, which need attention.  Instead, the EU should grant real and tangible market 
access to African countries by dealing with non-trade barriers (NTBs), including granting 
more flexibility on rules-of-origin and inordinately burdensome health and 
environmental standards.    
 
But then, African countries should speak up and defend their own interests. It will be recalled 
that the Council of European Trade and Development Ministers met in the fall of 2007 with 
their African counterparts. At least two European Development Ministers took to task the Trade 
Commissioner, expressing doubt about the development impact of the EPAs.  Not one African 
stood up and said, "I agree with the Dutch and the Italians on their observations on the EPAs." 
They just kept silent.  It is extremely difficult then as a rich country to take issues with the 
European Trade Commissioner who would wonder whether we know African interests better 
than Africans themselves.  This has been a recurrent experience for me, not only in the field of 
trade, but also in other spheres of development efforts.   
 
 African Finance Ministers should be more vocal about the quality of aid, and should relentlessly 
advocate changes in donor behavior.  
 African leaders like the former president of Tanzania, Benjamin William Mkapa, who is known 
all over as a person with enormous credibility and integrity, and who possess a record of 
effective leadership in economic reforms should continue to speak out on trade issues, poor 
performance by the G8, especially on Glenn Eagles commitments on which nothing has been 
delivered, and the quality of aid, among other issues. 
 In speaking out in support of the efforts by some Development Cooperation Ministers who are 
doing the right thing in the area of trade and aid reforms, countries such as South Africa (that is 
not dependent on aid) and Nigeria (that should not) need to do a lot more on behalf of the 
continent. 
 There are a lot of success stories on progress by African countries in the achievement of some of 
the MDGs. Ghana is on track to achieving the poverty goal; 10 countries have shown strong 
indications in achieving the education goal; Mozambique has made substantial progress on the 
infant mortality goal; Tanzania has progressed on most of the goals; Burkina Faso and Mali are 
on target to meeting a number of other goals, while Senegal is expected to secure the eighth goal. 
There are other promising cases as well. 
 Africa countries must continue to invest in the building of capacity. The massive injection of 
billions of dollars in the old-fashioned technical assistance in Africa has failed to deliver 
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development results. Technical assistance programs are not built on local knowledge and 
development priorities. This is undermining human and institutional capacity, perpetuating aid 
dependence and destroying people's motivation to take charge of their own futures.  
 Development assistance should be driven and guided by recipient's development priorities and 
capacity building strategies. Development assistance that does not have a clear path to 
sustainable capacity building and growth is of little or no value. To this, Africans must say "No". 
 
Thus, in all, Africa must take charge of its development, push for trade and aid reforms and continue to 
invest in the development of its capacity. 
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AFRICA AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: 
SUCCESSES, PITFALLS AND AREAS FOR  
FURTHER REFORMS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) through its Knowledge Management 
Department (KMD, ACBF) is geared towards generating, sharing, disseminating and utilizing 
knowledge for capacity building and development management. The ACBF knowledge management 
program seeks to achieve four major objectives, amongst others.  These are to: 
 
• Enhance the performance of internal project and program operations based on best-practice 
methodologies, strategies and instruments.   
• Foster the sharing of best practices in capacity building, in the design and implementation of 
development policies and programs as well as in reform programs that are directed at 
strengthening the effectiveness of Africa's development process.   
• Contribute to programs and mechanisms for extracting and sharing tacit knowledge for the 
benefit of national and regional development.  
• Enhance returns to, and the efficiency of, investments in capacity building 
 
One of the key instruments in the Foundation's knowledge management toolkit is the Senior 
Policymakers and Development Managers' Knowledge Sharing Program (SPM-KSP). The program 
provides a platform for successful development practitioners - either currently serving or on 
retirement, sabbatical, or leave of absence, who have made significant contributions to the 
development process especially insofar as it relates to Africa - to share and document their tacit 
knowledge in the form of development memoirs, for the benefit of future efforts at African 
development. The program specifically targets very senior policymakers and development managers, 
including visiting academics and eminent guests to the Foundation. Participants are drawn selectively 
from national, regional, continental or global institutions. These consist of the public and private 
sectors organizations; national, regional and continental institutions; international development 
agencies; civil society organizations; ACBF partner institutions; tertiary institutions of learning; 
research and specialized training institutes, among others. 
 
It is in this context that ACBF extended an invitation to Ms. Eveline Herfkens to participate in the 
SPM-KSP, to share her profound experience in international development - both as the current head 
of the UN Millennium Campaign, a former Executive Director of the World Bank, and an ex-
Minister of Development Cooperation in the Netherlands - guided by the theme: Africa and 
Development Assistance Cooperation - Successes, Pitfalls & Areas for Further Reforms. 
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II. PROFILE OF THE CONTRIBUTOR 
 
Currently the Executive Coordinator of the UN Millennium Campaign since October 2002, Ms 
Eveline Herfkens served as the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation between 1998 
and 2002, concurrently serving as a member of the World Bank and IMF Development Committee. 
She is also a member of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, 
established by the International Labor Organization.  Between 1996 and 1998, Ms. Herfkens served 
as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Permanent Representative of the 
Netherlands to the UN, WTO and other international organizations.  Between 1990 and 1996, Ms. 
Herfkens was an Executive Director of the World Bank Group in Washington DC. Prior to this, 
Ms. Herfkens served as Member of Parliament in the Netherlands (1981-1990); Member and 
Counselor-Treasurer of Parliamentarians for Global Action (1985-1990); Member of the Economic 
Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; Co-organizer of the North-
South Campaign; as well as Policy Officer in the field of development cooperation at the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1976-1981).   
 
 
III. INTERVIEW GUIDING QUESTIONS 
 
Drawing on the foregoing rich profile, Ms. Herfkens had an insightful face-to-face interview with 
ACBF KMD in November 2007 with a focus on Africa and Development Assistance Cooperation.  
The following questions guided the interview: 
 
 From a donor-country point of view, what are the challenges of dealing with domestic 
political economy issues when raising funds for development assistance to Africa? 
 What are the expectations of donor countries towards ODA-recipient countries, which 
would qualify the latter for development assistance? 
 Within the G8, what are the challenges in international donor coordination regarding the 
generation of sufficient and predictable funding for development assistance, taking the 
Nordic countries as a benchmark? 
 Can you shed some light on the unsettled question of the optimal modalities for aid delivery 
mechanisms in Africa, balancing the reality of government failure on the one hand, and the 
exigency of capacity building of the same African governments in order to improve public-
service delivery on the other? Is the rising growth of parliamentary democracy and 
strengthening economic management in Africa yielding aid dividends on the scale of mutual 
accountability for results between donors and recipients? 
 
5. Given your long career on the donor-side of development assistance, directly or otherwise, 
what are your impressions regarding the thinking on the delivery and management of development 
assistance in Africa, especially within the context of the March 2002 Paris Declaration and similar 
initiatives?   
 
6. What are your achievements and frustrations at the helm of the Millennium Campaign in 
trying to raise awareness on Africa's challenges at meeting the MDGs by 2015? 
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IV. TRANSCRIPT OF KNOWLEDGE-SHARING INTERVIEW 
 
 
What follows in this section is a record of the interview between the Knowledge Management 
Department (KMD, ACBF) of the African Capacity Building Foundation, and Ms. Herfkens.  
Herein, Ms. Herfkens shares her thoughts and experiences guided by the theme: Africa and 
Development Assistance Cooperation — Successes, Pitfalls & Areas for Further Reforms.    
   
KMD, ACBF: From a donor-country point of view, what are the challenges of dealing with domestic 
political economy issues when raising funds for development assistance in Africa? And, what are the 
expectations of donor countries towards ODA-recipient countries, which would qualify the latter for 
development assistance? 
 
Ms. Herfkens: I think for aid to be spent well it is crucial that you can work with partner 
governments that give you a minimum degree of comfort for you to tell your Parliament and 
taxpayers that the money would be spent well: they must be committed to fighting corruption, and 
have sound policies in place, for which they are prepared to be held to account, not just by donors, 
but more importantly, by their own people.  As long as capital flight out of a country is larger than 
the aid it receives, donors could start questioning why they should have more confidence in this 
place than the people themselves.   
 
Secondly, leaders should have serious commitment to poverty reduction policies themselves.  It is 
very hard to defend spending aid in African countries, if the feeling among northern taxpayers is that 
African governments themselves do not care about poverty reduction.  Relatively poor taxpayers in 
the Netherlands would find it untenable to pay money to merely prop-up the rich elites in recipient 
countries.  So, ethical behavior and serious commitment to caring about the poor by aid-recipient 
governments, translated into policies that actually address poverty, are the two concerns that I think 
are very important for mobilizing domestic resources in the North for investing in African countries. 
 
Lastly, governance should be inclusive in the sense that people participate in decisions that affect 
them. I am an early and outspoken advocate of “ownership”, but ownership of course is not limited 
to ownership by governments only. Country ownership implies serious efforts to involve parliament, 
citizens and their organizations; particularly those representing the most disadvantaged and 
marginalized sections of society. Their involvement in holding government to account for public 
expenditure and in formulating, implementing and monitoring policies and programs is critical to 
development effectiveness.  
 
 
Issue of Western Superiority 
 
Regarding the challenges for Development Cooperation Ministers dealing with their domestic 
political issues, I think the most difficult one for me always has been this attitude of Western 
superiority. The attitude that —maybe the Dutch are even worse than other donors —“we know 
better”. Donor-driven projects fit-in with the myth of Western superiority, and indeed even 
reinforce it.  We lecture, you listen; we give, you receive; we know, you learn; we take care of things, 
because you cannot; undermining Africans' own responsibilities, we take over.  
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When thinking about technical assistance, I am reminded of what a friend from Mozambique once 
told me: "when you move to my country, you are by definition an expatriate expert. But when I 
move to yours, I am only an immigrant."  
Not realizing that we do not develop you, but you develop yourselves. And that concept is behind a 
lot of the donor hobbies.  We know what your biggest problem is and how to deal with it.  That is 
the attitude.  So that leads to all these vertical funds. You know, we have got money for HIV/AIDS, 
we have got money to get your kids to school… but it all comes from a limited envelope.  There is a 
real danger therefore that taxpayers in the North could be funding priorities that are disconnected 
with the real needs on the ground, which would be exceedingly wasteful.  
 
So this supply-driven attitude, I think, is something that we should fight. Nevertheless, the idea that 
donors must respect stakeholder ownership for development interventions in aid-recipient 
countries, and that the recipients really know their needs and priorities better, is very hard to get 
through to parliamentarians and the general public in the North.  Of course ownership should be 
inclusive ownership, not just the Finance Ministry or the government.  National plans (or strategic 
frameworks) that arise from inclusive consultative processes would be a good port-of-call for 
gleaning the true priorities of recipient countries.   
 
Issue of Donor Visibility 
 
The second issue is this demand of donors to be visible.  Ministers traveling want to have a photo 
opportunity and hoist their national or organizational flag in front of the little school that their 
taxpayers’ money had been building. Yet this is one of the problems with aid delivery mechanisms 
that undermine ownership.  This problem is especially acute nowadays compared to some sixteen or 
seventeen years ago when there was a limited number of bilateral donors, before the latter-day entry 
of additional ones from Finland, Estonia, Greece, Portugal, et cetera.  Indeed, one of the drivers for 
the multiplicity of (relatively atomistic) aid boutiques with huge transaction costs to recipients is this 
quest for flag visibility, which spawns the challenge of how to curtail this competition between 
donors among their collective taxpayers.  So that is the second issue. We have to stop thinking in 
terms of “Dutch or Italian” projects, but talk about   Mozambique or Mali’s programs instead.   
 
Fighting Vested Interests at Home 
 
The third issue concerns vested interests at home.  In many of the big donor countries you have a 
huge development industry. A lot of jobs are derived from development aid. The Netherlands 
started its Development Cooperation some 57 years ago when we were thrown out of Indonesia.  
Thousands of tropical agriculture experts, tropical health experts came back to the Netherlands. So 
we started with Development Cooperation to create jobs for these (displaced) experts.  And we 
continued to have universities, which teach these “tropical” disciplines, and students expect the 
Dutch Development Cooperation to create jobs for them.   
 
I tried to counter these vested interests at home. I went to universities in the Netherlands to tell 
students that the days of the expatriate experts are over. I told them, you can study whatever you 
want but I am not going to provide you a job. This did not contribute to my popularity at home.  
 
Vested interests are also found in NGOs in the North, a lot of which are very dependant on the 
largesse from the Development Cooperation Ministry. In fact, these allocations are also “tied aid”. 
Much of these funds are in fact channeled to their counterparts in the South: why would not these 
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receive funds directly from the Ministry, without the overhead of Northern NGOs? But the latter 
resist “untying” this part of the aid budget.  
 
In the U.S. many NGOs even depend on distributing tied food-aid for their financing. Only now a 
few of them decided not to accept this anymore, given the negative impact of in-kind food aid on 
local farmers. In Italy, as soon as there was some hope, the country finally started to increase its 
development co-operation budget, instead of campaigning for aid effectiveness; many NGOs only 
focused on getting their piece of the pie.  It is very hard to take on these vested interests while you 
try to enhance aid effectiveness. 
  
Let me give another example. When I became Development Cooperation Minister, there were still 
tens of Dutch doctors practicing in the rural areas of Ghana, paid out of the development budget.  
This was very costly because these people had relatively good salaries and perks, not least their four-
wheel drive vehicles suited to the African terrain.  In the meantime, Ghanaian doctors were leaving 
Ghana to work in hospitals in Washington or London.  So my idea was to withdraw these Dutch 
doctors, freeing up funds that would help pay for hundreds of Ghanaian doctors to stay in Ghana.  
My hunch was that they did not need that much more of a salary, rather a little bit of the perks; the 
four wheel drive and the energy supply to ensure that the fridges were working for the medicines, 
and a little top-up of salary would be enough of an incentive for Ghanaian medical personnel to stay 
put in their home country.  Most people do not want to go elsewhere, they want to stay home. As I 
was moving Dutch aid to budget support in Ghana, I suggested to add the money saved by 
withdrawing Dutch doctors to supplement the Health budget to allow for supplementary funding to 
create incentives for Ghanaian doctors to practice in Ghana.  The Finance Minister in Ghana agreed 
with me.  So what happened?   
 
The organization in the Netherlands that sends out doctors of course was very much dependant on 
the development budget, so it started a campaign against me.  And the headline was I was “killing 
babies in Africa”, ostensibly because withdrawal of Dutch doctors would be the end of health care 
for babies. And it was a very tough issue that one faced, because these groups used the good cause 
to cover up their own vested interests. It was very hard reality to battle.   
 
And the Reticence of Africans Makes it Worse 
 
And my biggest frustration at the time was that there would be no African voice speaking out 
publicly for you if you did the hard thing. I can give you many examples of occasions when I was 
trying to do the right thing: Africans happily agreed but were not prepared to speak out publicly.  
And then it was very hard if you had to battle your own parliament, your own public opinion to do 
the right thing. Meanwhile, while Africans would only privately acknowledge you for your valor, they 
would not stand by you in public when all hell breaks loose. What is the purpose of having 
Ambassadors in donor capitals? 
 
So to battle the vested interests in your own country, which are paid out of the ODA budget is an 
uphill task. In a country like Portugal, universities depend very much on the development 
cooperation budget, which pays for scholarships for African students to study in Portugal, without 
any check to ascertain if the content of the university study is relevant upon students’ return to their 
home countries, if they would return at all.  
 
Spain is another case in point.  Part of the Spanish development budget is spent on promoting 
Spanish history, Spanish culture, Spanish language, etc.  That is a waste of money with respect to 
bottom-line development results.  There is an inherent conundrum though, deriving from the fact 
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that taxpayers in the north do wield votes and can protest if one tries to restructure development 
cooperation contrary to their interests.  So these vested interests are very, very hard to tackle.  And it 
would be wonderful, if an Education Minister in Africa, better yet a group of them, would stand-up 
and say, we do not want any development aid wasted anymore. Our pupils who study in Europe or 
America never return or study irrelevant curricular.  We would prefer that the aid money be spent in 
the recipient countries on education, preferably primary, but otherwise in strengthening and 
improving tertiary education in our countries.   
 
KMD, ACBF: But they don’t want to bite the hand that feeds them? 
 
Ms. Herfkens:  That is indeed the problem, though they should care about development aid getting 
wasted in tremendous amounts.  The same observation holds for tied technical cooperation, one of 
the things I have always been fighting against.  In many of my speeches there are references to this 
and how at the end of the day technical cooperation actually undermines Africans taking 
responsibility for their own development.  Billions of aid are still spent on expatriate staff with their 
four-wheel drives and other perquisites, counting as development money that could be spent in 
much better ways.  Why can Africans not get together and say, “We are going to resist tied aid 
including technical assistance; we do not want it”.  It is not a freebie; it is out of your (ipso facto 
limited) ODA envelope. 
 
KMD, ACBF: I suppose organizations like ACBF have started to do that, funding and rallying 
support for capacity building for higher education in Africa, as well as funding specific post-graduate 
training programs in applied policy analysis and management, and public administration within 
Africa, as a counterpoint to the tradition of sending African students abroad? 
 
Ms. Herfkens: But that means that they should get African governments to start saying, “no, we don't 
want that anymore, untie it.  We want to choose the best people, preferably Africans.  But if some 
expertise is really needed that is not available in Africa then at least let us get the best person for the 
money from wherever.”   
 
KMD, ACBF: So there are a lot of difficult issues.  With the three points that you made about 
respecting ownership, flag planting, and vested interests, it is a sort of a catch-22 situation… how do 
you change those perceptions?  How do you unravel that? 
 
Ms. Herfkens: Just tell the plain truth about what kind of aid is effective and efficient in terms of 
actual poverty reduction.  I tried to do so when I was a Minister in the Netherlands, and I think I am 
proven right because my policies ultimately got the support of public opinion.  One had to make the 
case that ultimately, the Dutch taxpayer wants to contribute to achieving bottom-line development 
results, key of which is poverty reduction.  In particular, I argued that appreciably more babies 
would be saved with the new plan.  Public opinion is quite rational though it takes a lot of time to 
actually invest in the public debate before these vested interests can be exposed.  The problem is 
that one really has to spend more time on it than most Development Cooperation Ministers are 
typically prepared to put in.  Educating public opinion is a long-term investment for which most 
politicians do not have much incentive, not least because one is typically in government for a limited 
time, say three or four years, implying therefore that educating public opinion is not a priority for a 
lot of Ministers.   
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KMD, ACBF: Within the G8, what are the challenges in international donor coordination 
regarding the generation of sufficient and predictable funding for development assistance, taking the 
Nordic countries as a benchmark? …Moving onto the Millennium Development Goals, there have 
been a number of initiatives when it comes to the G8 and lots of aid contributions and suggestions on 
how to change things… Why is it that a lot of these initiatives are never followed through? 
Ms. Herfkens:  
 
Lip Service 
 
The problem is that international meetings like the UN General Assembly can create platforms for 
governments to talk, to make speeches, to make pledges, to sign onto international documents and 
consensus. But there is no international organization that can actually send the police after a country 
if they do not implement what they promise.  We live in a world of sovereign states and no foreigner 
can fly into a country and lecture to get things done. There is no international mechanism to ensure 
implementation of promises made, or compliance with Declarations agreed internationally, be it at 
the UN or the G 8.  
 
The only way you can get a government to implement what it promised is if its own citizens and 
parliament hold it to account.  So governments can make the most moving speeches at the United 
Nations, or other international forums, but if they take the plane home and revert to business as 
usual, they can get away with it, unless their own citizens and parliaments actually hold them to 
account.  Thus, a lot of these international meetings are just for public relations, for the cameras, 
and I think the G8 is most guilty of this shortcoming.  There is no monitoring and follow-up 
whatsoever on promises and pledges.  It does not become specific in terms of who is doing what. 
 
G8 Ignorance 
 
I come from the Netherlands: within two hours drive you are abroad and have to speak another 
language. In a country like the U.S. half of the Congressmen do not even have passports.  Here in 
the U.S. you can drive for days on end, and you still do not run into another country.  Bigger 
countries are much more inward looking. So, even less, you cannot influence such inward-looking 
countries at all as a foreigner.  They do not care much about what even the Secretary General of the 
United Nations has to say.  In most G8 countries there is a fairly high level of ignorance on 
development issues (less so in the U.K.), compared to the Scandinavians or the Netherlands.  
 
According to polls, the average American thinks more than 15% of the federal budget is actually 
spent on aid, and states that it should be around 10 %. The actual percentage is less than one, so 
desirably, there should be public support for some 15-fold increase! Americans are not less generous 
at all: they are just ignorant… 
 
Investing in Education 
 
One of the interesting things to mention in this regard is, when the 0.7% resolution was passed at 
the United Nations, another resolution passed which had been proposed by President Julius Nyerere 
at the time, that every rich country should spend at least 1% of their development budget on 
educating their own citizens on development issues.  And the group of countries that tends to 
meticulously implement whatever comes from the UN, the Scandinavians and the Netherlands, 
actually implemented that too.  So for 38 years now in the Netherlands and in the Nordic countries, 
there has been steady investment in education of the people, not only through the formal school 
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system but also through supporting civil society and citizens that want to build public awareness, 
public opinion around these issues. Thus, in these countries there have emerged over the years 
tremendously strong political constituencies for these issues across parties, left or right. Contrary to 
common perceptions you can have the most right-wing government in history in Denmark or in the 
Netherlands, they still spend more than 0.7%, they still have relatively better aid effectiveness and 
take more pro-development positions in E.U. Trade Councils. So that investment in education is 
effectively paying off.   
 
This type of investment is however lacking in most of the G8 countries.  Of course in the U.K. 
some of this has been done.  In the U. K. you have very powerful civil society as well. And you see 
in the U.K. that it is again bi-partisan.  The Tories have now also promised that they would achieve 
the 0.7% target. So that investment is very important. I see now in Japan that they have also decided, 
but that was only a few years ago, to start covering these issues in their formal education system. I 
am convinced that some ten to fifteen years from now we will see this translated in more pro-
development policies in Japan.   
 
The United States 
 
Here in the United States there is also another problem, which is, whenever you advocate more 
international aid, the first riposte often is: "What about poverty at home?" This is less the case 
elsewhere because the US is a more unequal society.   
 
Second, the conception of the role of governments is different in the US.  While it is totally normal 
in the Netherlands that you pay taxes for development cooperation, alongside those for the 
museum, the university, etc, in the US a lot of what we perceive as being basic government 
functions that you pay taxes for, are dependent on private charity.  And that is also a difficult debate.  
To what extent is it the federal government’s responsibility to care about the poor elsewhere, given 
the fact that it is not even clear to most Americans that it is the government’s responsibility to take 
care of the poor at home?  That makes it very difficult.   
 
Nevertheless, there are many good NGOs working really hard in the US to try to create public 
awareness on these issues. All the Democratic candidates for the current election season have fairly 
good positions on development issues.  A few of them are now even advocating creating a Cabinet 
level position for development issues. This is of crucial importance. Presently within the G 8 only 
Germany and the U.K have a cabinet-level Development Cooperation Minister, which allows for the 
voices of the poor being heard in the corridors of power. There is need to actually get that voice out 
to counter those of the foreign affairs establishments, which favor planting flags, seeking visibility 
and linking aid with security and geo-politics. However, to obtain a Cabinet level position, is a bit of 
the chicken-and-egg conundrum: you do not get that until development is a relevant political issue, 
which is hard to achieve unless you have a cabinet-level position for it, which enables a powerful 
voice in your own public opinion to advocate these issues.    
 
Another footnote on the US: USAID is the only aid outfit that I know that is not allowed by law to 
actually publicize itself. While most Development Cooperation Ministries are actually spending 
money to show taxpayers development results — it is perceived as being part of their job to actually 
do so — USAID cannot do that.  So this is also a missing element in the toolkit of ways to get to 
the US public opinion important development cooperation issues.   
  
The bottom line is that all politics is local and unless you have an indigenous effort by local voters 
nothing happens. The essence is that politicians have to feel that they are going to win votes and not 
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lose them if they do the right thing on development.  Now in the Scandinavian countries every 
politician knows they are not going to win elections if they promise to cut the development budget 
below the 0.7% target.   
 
KMD, ACBF: Can you shed some light on the unsettled question of the optimal modalities of aid 
delivery systems in Africa, balancing the reality of government failure on the one hand, and the 
exigency of capacity building of the same African governments in order to improve public service 
delivery on the other?  Is the growth of parliamentary democracy and strengthening economic 
management in Africa yielding aid dividends on the scale of mutual accountability between donor and 
recipients? 
 
Ms Herfkens:  Absolutely!!!  The perception has always been that governments and public sector 
institutions do not function well in Africa. Thus, many donors do not listen to governments, do not 
fund them and often try to even bypass them to work through NGOs. It is high time we helped 
build up functioning public sectors and institutions in Africa and find a better balance working with 
governments and NGO’s to deliver aid most effectively. 
 
Governments Must Work in Africa 
 
I believe that the only way to get sustainable health, sustainable education, development, and achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals, is to help make governments work.  As long as governments 
do not work, you can have the best of intentions for humanitarian assistance, but it is not going to 
be sustainable, it is not going to survive once the donor leaves.  Governments need to take their 
responsibilities seriously.   
 
Indeed, life has become a great deal much easier for us advocating this because there is an incredible 
amount of reforms going on in Africa.  If you look at economic management there are still some 
nagging spots, but there has been an incredible improvement. The same goes for democracy. 
Although I find democracy a difficult term: even among democratic countries, few agree on what in 
essence defines democracy. The essence to me is domestic accountability: the requirement that 
governments are accountable to their own citizens and their own parliaments (instead of to their 
donors, their paymasters).  And you see an incredible improvement of that too: civil society is 
thriving in many African countries and the functioning of parliaments is improving. 
 
Africans need to invest more in the building of the capacity of their parliaments: I think it is one of 
the most important issues that Africans have to deal with themselves: how to empower their 
legislatures is more than anything a domestic responsibility, even if donors can help finance needs 
such as computers and training.   
 
Aid Delivery and the Paris Declaration  
 
For countries where parliamentary democracy, accountability and transparency as well as good 
economic management have deep roots, the Paris Declaration is the silver bullet for aid delivery, 
particularly budget support for the good performers. I have been a strong advocate for this from the 
outset.   My article in The African Economic Review, 1999, was the opening shot of this new 
approach to ownership, alignment and donor harmonization.  I edited it from a speech I gave at the 
UNECA-sponsored African Finance Ministers’ Caucus that year.  In that speech, I said: 
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“We donors have to be much more helpful than in the past. We do not have an unblemished record. 
We have regularly bothered developing countries with our latest hobbies. We have imposed counterpart 
and recurrent costs on their budgets, without talking to them first to find out if it was a good idea to 
start specific projects in the first place. We have been micromanaging. Each of us has different 
procedures for accounting, for procurement, for evaluation etc. We have been erratic in terms of our 
commitments and unpredictable to recipients, in terms of both timing and volume of funding. We have 
tied our aid in a way, which is both costly and prone to corruption. We have imposed a huge number 
of missions on beneficiary countries. They had to wine and dine us instead of focusing on what they 
should be doing: running their countries and trying to develop their own policies. And, even worse, we 
went behind the back of the Ministers of Finance and Planning – by adopting regions, creating our 
own little enclaves, running them without bothering to talk to governments, local or national, and 
recruiting with high salaries the best civil servants from their administrations, thus undercutting their 
institutional capacity. Finally, we acted inconsistently by supporting our own exports with our aid and 
at the same time not allowing recipients to sell products in our countries because of our protectionist 
trade policies. These are bad habits and I commit myself to improving the behavior of the Netherlands 
as a donor.”  
 
And I did.  
 
The fillip to change the aid paradigm, was very much prompted and pushed by, on the one hand, 
four development Ministers who wanted to do things different on our side, dubbed the Utstein 
Group, comprising Hilde Johnson from Norway, Clare Short from the U.K., myself (from the 
Netherlands), and Heidi Marie Wieczoreck-Zeul from Germany.  The four of us visited Tanzania, 
acknowledging what a headache each individual donor was, pledging we would merge our efforts 
into ONE “headache” instead of four, prompting an incredible successful endeavor among ALL 
donors in Dar-es-Salaam to harmonize, which experience touched off the global agreement that 
culminated and was later codified in the Paris Declaration.  
 
On the demand side of aid, we were happy to find a lot of reforming Finance Ministers in Africa, 
not least Donald Kaberuka (Rwanda), Luísa Dias Diogo (Mozambique), and various Finance 
Ministers in Tanzania, Uganda and Mali, to name the very successful ones. 
 
Together with the then Executive Secretary of UNECA, Kingsley Y. Amoako, we created this 
platform called “The Big Table” of Ministers (I hosted its second meeting in Amsterdam) in which 
African Finance Ministers felt less inhibited to tell the truth a little bit more on the African side.  
ECA is still hosting these “Big Tables”, but the format has changed, and Ministerial attendance, 
particularly from the OECD side has tumbled, so it lost its intended character, and thus the candid 
conversation.   
 
At that time also, for the first time ever, we developed the concept of “mutual accountability”: 
recipients should not only be accountable to donors, but donors should be accountable to Partner 
Countries for their pledges and efforts, including the importance of multi-year predictability of aid.   
 
In this context, Donald Kaberuka and I chaired an important Roundtable at the Third UN 
Conference on LDCs in 2001, launching the idea of a “Framework for Mutual Commitments”.  We 
did not get much traction at the time, but now this concept has become part of the Paris Agenda on 
Aid Effectiveness. 
 10
 
When I left office in the summer of 2002, still some donor countries had not joined the consensus 
on this new aid paradigm.  So, UNECA invited me once again to address the same forum of African 
Finance Ministers, in Johannesburg, where I reiterated the most important points: 
 
“Many failures of aid that you are blamed for actually represent the failure of the donor community to harmonize and 
adjust our delivery systems. Donors should finally get rid of their multiple, high cost aid boutiques, planting flags and 
offering only their hobbies. As far as these are relevant at all, they are very limited in geographical and sectoral scope 
and undermine ownership and local institutional capacity. Donors have to stop pushing blueprints for development 
written at their headquarters. They have to shift from procedures to real impact. They have to move away from supply-
driven projects. Sometimes these projects have had temporary successes at the micro level. But they have been irrelevant 
and thus a waste of scarce resources at the macro and sectoral levels” 
 
The good news is that, five years later, a much larger number of donors now acknowledge that they 
are part of the problem. By now there is genuine consensus in the OECD/DAC, in the 
Development Committee and in other relevant donor forums on what we donors have to do to 
become part of the solution, and the Paris Declaration is a concrete agreed plan of action, with 
timelines and indicators to improve aid effectiveness.  
  
What I had not realized when I started to advocate budget support for good performers, was the 
fact that it created, for the first time ever, crucial incentives to improve public financial management 
for both the recipient and the donors. This has enormously contributed to improving public 
financial management in recipient countries, which means not only that northern taxpayers’ money 
is spent better, but —and this is much more important —domestic resources in recipient countries 
are used more effectively.    
 
The whole aid debate had ignored much too long that development is not just about the marginal 
donor Dollar or Pound spent well, but about how aid-recipient countries spend their own resources.  
Even in the most aid-dependent country, domestic resources ultimately constitute the bulk of the 
finances for development.  And over time the only way to finance achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals and thus, to finance development, is domestic resource mobilization and 
efficient utilization of such resources.   
 
Therefore, I think the Paris Declaration and the move towards budget support have made enormous 
difference for these countries where the quality of economic management and accountability 
provide a basis for their implementation.  
 
Regarding your earlier question about donor expectations towards recipient countries, let me add the 
criteria I used for them to qualify for budget support.  In that same speech in 1999 in which I 
announced I was prepared to simply write checks, be predictable and reliable, fitting in with the 
recipients overall planning and budget, I did put a few conditions: a basic agreement, reflecting 
international consensus on what good sector policies (in health, education) are; decentralization to 
empower local governments to deliver basic services, and —most importantly —basic agreement on 
a broad fiscal framework:  
 
“I must be able to tell my Parliament and the Dutch taxpayers: ‘I gave this check to the Minister of 
Health and I can assure you it will not end up on the Defense Minister’s desk.’ We have to agree on a 
broad fiscal framework for donors to be informed of total public expenditure. And I really mean all of it: 
no shadow budget, not just the development budget, but all public expenditure, because money is fungible 
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and therefore aid is fungible. Sound public expenditure policies and effective public expenditure 
management are crucial elements of good governance —and of this new partnership.”  
 
And in Johannesburg, three and a half years later, I reiterated: 
  
“If you want budget support, then that presupposes decent public expenditure management on your part. 
Otherwise you can’t expect budget support. It presupposes accountability to your own people and your 
policies being validated by your own people. In particular, you should allow and foster parliamentary 
scrutiny, and not only civic engagement. Budgeting systems are important as well, to absorb increasing aid 
levels. 
 
 I am concerned about how many donors have started complaining about the absorptive capacity problem. 
Please help me remove that fig leaf, which is used as an excuse not to raise ODA. Prove that you can 
cope with more funds, especially in sectors relevant to the MDGs, such as health and education.  
 
Ownership can only work if you, Ministers of Finance, take charge and take responsibility. That implies 
your active involvement in the public debate leading to poverty reduction strategies, underlining the 
limitations of the envelope and educating people about the concept of opportunity costs. Taking charge also 
means: say no, make the donors accountable, say no when doing business with a donor is just too costly, 
say no to supply-driven and tied aid.  
 
I acknowledge that this is a tall order. It presupposes a high level of performance and governance. I am 
aware that some in this audience object to increase linking of aid to performance. However – as a friend – 
I will tell you the truth: performance-driven allocation of aid is here to stay. The reality is that the same 
amount of money lifts three to five times as many people out of poverty in well-performing countries. 
Taxpayers and legislatures insist on more bangs for their buck in terms of reducing poverty and child 
mortality and getting kids to school. There is no such thing as aid fatigue – as long as aid contributes to 
achieving the MDGs.  
 
There is however fatigue among northern taxpayers and parliaments when it comes to bailing out local 
elites who fail to deal with poverty in their own country. Local elites who prefer to continue rent seeking 
instead of pushing for reform in order to achieve real and sustainable poverty reduction by achieving the 
MDGs. These goals are part and parcel of the Global Deal, of the mutual obligations which are at the 
heart of NEPAD and which we codified in Monterrey.” 
 
Now what do you do with countries that do not meet these criteria?  This is the big thing for which 
the donor community has no answer.   And I do not think there is much of an answer, because I do 
not believe we foreigners can fix governance challenges in Africa.  Conditionality does not generate 
reforms.  If reforms are not owned they are simply not going to happen. I learned a lot being on the 
board of the World Bank.  You had structural adjustment loan number seven, with the same 
conditions as in structural adjustment loan number one because they were never fulfilled. Or they 
were quickly fulfilled to get the money and then reversed.  Conditionality simply does not work 
without domestic ownership.  So there is no way that donor money can on its own give rise to 
improved governance. It has to come from the inside. What we can do as an international donor 
community in the meantime, is giving humanitarian aid, which is per definition marginal and, in the 
long run, not sustainable.  
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Do No Harm, Empower People 
 
People should be empowered through aid and by their governments. Any child who does not go 
hungry and goes to school is empowered later in life to demand better accountability from his/her 
own government. The same goes for health issues: there are always ways that you can by-pass 
governments.  However, we have to be extremely careful in this type of aid, not to perpetuate the 
situation.  If you do not work through governments, you have to be really careful not to do any 
harm and revert to the mistakes we made with 60 years of development cooperation: when we, 
donors, run the projects, the citizens start to look at us, the donor community, for fulfillment of 
their needs, instead of demanding that their own governments shape up.  
 
And there is no better way to get their own government to shape up than having their own citizens 
stand up, speak out and put an end to the abuse they are suffering, demanding accountability.  You 
have to be very, very careful if you bypass governments not to undermine the ultimate objective of 
getting the citizens to hold their government to account.  As a result, I always tell NGOs not to put 
the emphasis on building schools.  Rather they should empower citizens to demand the building of 
schools from their governments.  This old donor-driven project mold is just not working.  It leads to 
a waste of funds. However, if it is doing harm ultimately to the purpose, and undermines ultimate 
development objectives then we're in trouble.  So we have to be very careful.  
 
KMD, ACBF: Is it appropriate for you to argue that NGOs should not focus on building 
schools…when a celebrity like Oprah Winfrey is building a girl's academy in South Africa? 
 
Ms. Herfkens: I do not think that is the most effective way to spend your money. 
 
KMD, ACBF: What should she have done? 
 
Ms. Herfkens:  
 
Do Not Raise Funds, Raise Voices 
 
I think empowering civil society to demand more accountability and better education for all is more 
sustainable: it generates more bang for public resources. The case that you cited will only help a 
limited number of girls. But by contributing to a movement, she will ensure that the South African 
school system - particularly since South Africa is the richest country on the continent - actually 
provides a decent education for all girls, and that way many more would benefit.   
 
This is one of the biggest problems of the Millennium Campaigns in rich countries. We try to raise 
awareness about poverty out there, to educate people to hold their governments to account for their 
international promises to provide more and better aid, but the immediate Pavlov reaction of people 
is charity: “Where can I send a check?”  My advice to audiences in rich countries is: “do not raise 
funds, raise your voices. Raise your voice to hold your government accountable to deliver on their 
promises”.   
 
Also from a practical point of view this is more effective.  The billion people living in extreme 
poverty simply cannot rely on the charity of the less than a billion citizens in rich countries. Private 
initiatives, by definition small, however many times multiplied, will never compensate for the lack of 
government action in living up to what they promised. For instance, the G8, during its summit in 
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Glenn Eagles, Scotland in July 2005, promised to deliver an additional $50 billion annually.  There is 
no way that private charity can make up for their lack of implementation of this promise.  Hence, 
my line of argument is: “Raise your voices.  And as far as you are able to generate funds, try to invest 
such resources to strengthen voices in Africa for accountability.”  
 
KMD, ACBF: With the Millennium Development Goals Campaign, in October you had the 
"Stand up, Speak up Against Poverty." What did you hope to come out of that?    
 
Ms. Herfkens: The global Guinness Book of Records helps to attract a lot of media attention, but the 
essence of the campaign is to focus messages on the national or domestic front, since the required 
government action differs across countries.  In Europe it is: “live up to your 0.7% pledge; make aid 
more effective; and reform agriculture trade policies”.  In Nigeria, it is “ make our money work for us”.  
Thus, the messages are context, country or region-specific.  
 
The “Global Millennium Deal” is, on the one hand (Goal 8) that rich countries should increase aid, 
improve effectiveness and change the rules of trade to allow poor countries to export and stop 
destroying markets of poor farmers in poor countries by their agricultural policies: this is the focus 
of the Northern Millennium Campaigns. On the other hand, with this “Global Deal”, developing 
countries commit to taking primary responsibility for their development, and improving their 
governance and policies in order to achieve the first 7 Goals. And the Campaign’s message in 
developing countries is: even if rich countries do not comply with their part of the deal and continue 
to perform lousily, many governments in poor, even the poorest, countries can do a lot better: It is 
not rocket science or too costly to provide all kids with at least primary education.  You really do not 
need foreigners to help you with that.  Every developing country can do a better job at home by 
improving domestic resource mobilization, policies and financial management.  
 
KMD, ACBF: Carrying on from that and talking about better and more effective ways to deliver 
and spend aid, looking specifically at the point concerning trade, I know you have said a great deal 
about that; could you expand on what you would like to see come out of increased effectiveness, 
especially in the area of trade?   
 
In addition, what are your achievements and frustrations at the helm of the Millennium Campaign in 
trying to raise awareness on Africa's challenges at meeting the MDGs by 2015? 
 
Ms. Herfkens: Goal 8, regarding rich countries responsibility basically contains three elements: aid 
volume, aid effectiveness, and trade.  On trade I am really very disappointed that the Doha agenda is 
not delivering. Distortions in agricultural trade constitute one of the most important issues. As two 
thirds of the world's poor live in rural areas, and depend on agriculture for their livelihood, they will 
not be able to lift themselves out of poverty unless we (rich countries) stop destroying the markets 
they depend on to sell their produce. MDG 1 (regarding poverty and hunger) will not be achieved in 
many African countries unless rich countries’ agricultural policies change.  And I think my deepest 
disappointment over the last thirty years, has been that we were not able to get that sufficiently in 
rich countries’ public opinion.  It is also a problem of the present Millennium Campaigns: 0.7% you 
can put on a banner, but issues of aid effectiveness and trade are so difficult to simplify into 
campaign slogans.   
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Trade and Public Awareness 
 
Trade is the most difficult of all. Many reform programs in Africa based on export-led growth have 
failed. They will continue to fail unless participation in the global economy becomes a reality for 
Africa. For that to happen we have to open our markets. At present, the playing field is not level. 
Protectionism in the North is focused precisely on those products that matter to African producers - 
labor-intensive products and agricultural commodities. And we are carrying on with agricultural 
subsidies that crowd out African producers.  
 
However, the political economy in rich countries is complicated: though farmers are a tiny part of 
the population in terms of their votes, their vested interests are hugely influential politically, 
rendering it very hard to battle them.  This is the more difficult, given the general ignorance 
regarding trade issues, including in Europe.  Few people know that our present common agricultural 
system does not even help our own small farmers as mostly the rich farmers benefit, nor that it is 
bad for our own environment because incentives are for large-scale production, prompting the use 
of more pesticides, which in turn leads to more destruction of the environment.  It has been 
extremely difficult to get public opinion to understand that these policies in the meantime destroy 
the livelihood of small producers in poor countries.  
 
At present in northern Europe, the positions of the governments are basically adequate, and public 
awareness has deepened sufficiently.  In southern Europe, however - including France - the debate 
has not really yet started.  And one of the things I hope the Millennium Campaign manages to do is 
instigate public debates about these issues in these ‘frontier’ countries. Until now, in a country like 
Spain, you have the same people demonstrating in the morning for the 0.7% and demonstrating in 
the afternoon against tomatoes coming from Africa.  That part of the education is extremely 
important, but it will take some time to produce desired results. 
 
In the Netherlands, we had the first public debates about the consistency of our development 
cooperation objectives with our trade policies thirty years ago, and for the United Kingdom some 
twenty years ago. So, here it is possible to strengthen an already existing basic awareness, compared 
to Southern Europe where such awareness is barely existent.  The same is true in the United States. 
Regarding U.S. cotton subsidies, Bread for the World, among other NGOs, has made some efforts to 
create awareness regarding the devastating impact on West African cotton growers, and the New 
York Times published a few great articles about cotton subsidies, but less than one percent of the 
population of this country reads the New York Times. 
 
Again, we do not hear many African voices here on these issues.  I used to ask my African 
counterparts: would you not rather earn your foreign exchange on the international market than have 
to endure endless lectures by Bank and Fund officials and all these development cooperation 
ministers?  Many African governments are more focused on maximizing aid than trade 
opportunities. Most, until maybe very recently, do not even have cabinet level Trade Ministers with 
sufficiently capable staff.  
 
Let me illustrate with an example. I was the Netherlands Ambassador in Geneva, including to the 
WTO at the time of the Singapore Conference.  I was elected to the chairmanship of the WTO 
subcommittee for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and tried to put beef to the Singapore 
language to do something for this group of countries. I managed to forge consensus to launch the 
Integrated Framework for Trade Related Assistance. In the process, I discovered that actually most 
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of the African countries did not even have a Trade Minister.  There was little “ownership” of trade 
to begin with, which makes it quite useless for a donor to try to be helpful, a fortiori without a 
counter-part on the other side.  The agreed framework still exists, but it has been revamped and re-
launched several times since then.  At the root of many of its problems was the lack of ownership 
on the African side.  They were not focused on trade.  They were focused on aid.   
 
Africans not Speaking Out; Weak Ownership 
 
What happened at the launch of the Integrated Framework was typical: Africans not speaking out, 
not taking care of their own concerns. To identify the first pilots, to see how this framework for 
trade would work, we required the very minimum of ownership: two pages on the main problems 
the country’s exporters faced. However, even for that minimum some African representatives 
insisted they needed the provision of foreign consultants to write these.  I had this fight with one 
country's Ambassador who insisted on having consultants sent over to write that two-pager.  And I 
suggested to him to just talk with his own private sector, asking them what their problems were in 
exporting to western markets.  But he insisted donors should send consultants to do the task.  This 
really taught me a lot about ownership and the need for Africans to get their act together, and how 
little donors can contribute without ownership on the African side. Today, twelve years later, there is 
a lot of good news of that happening now.   
 
Let me share a very recent example regarding the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that 
Europe is trying to force-feed Africa, about which I have many doubts.  Only in Multilateral 
negotiations can poor countries muster the negotiating power —through forming broad alliances —
needed to extract real tangible concessions of relevance to them, e.g. on agriculture.  Similarly, it is 
only multilateral rules that can constrain the powerful countries (e.g. to arm twist on WTO plus) and 
protect the weak ones. Poor countries have extremely limited capacity for trade negotiations: they 
should not be forced to play chess on multiple boards if they can hardly get their act together in the 
WTO. And even if the DDA would deliver soon, sub-Saharan Africa in particular needs more time.  
Sub-regional integration within the African market should precede the EPAs, which would keep 
African Trade Negotiators fully occupied for quite some time.  
 
So the EU EPAs should: (1) yield to intra-African integration; (2) abstain from pushing Singapore or 
WTO-plus issues which have the effect of creating burdensome obligations and distracting from or 
inconsistent with development priorities; (3) not demand reciprocity, as reducing trade barriers for 
only the EU increases cost of imports and reduces much-needed government revenues. In other 
words, there are attendant trade-adjustment costs.  Instead, the EU should grant real, tangible 
market access, i.e. deal with non-trade barriers (NTBs), including more flexibility on rules-of-origin 
and inordinately burdensome health and environmental standards.    
 
But again, Africans should speak up and defend their own interests. The Councils of European 
Trade and Development Ministers met in the fall of 2007 with their African Counterparts. At least 
two European Development Ministers challenged the Trade Commissioner, doubting the 
development impact of these EPAs.  Not one African stood up and said, “I fully agree with the 
Dutch and the Italians, we should not do this.“ They just kept silent.  It is extremely difficult then as 
a rich country’s Development Cooperation Minister to fight the European Trade Commissioner 
who would retort, “who the heck are you?  Do you know African interests better than the Africans 
themselves?”  And this has been a recurrent experience for me, not only in the field of trade but also 
in other in other development realms as I mentioned in various places in this interview.   
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Tobacco and the US 
 
In the early nineties, when I was on the board of the World Bank, in this need to please the 
American public opinion, the Bank wanted to add to their list of sectors the Bank would not invest 
in, the tobacco sector.  For some African countries, tobacco is one of their most important export 
products.  We in Europe even subsidize tobacco production in Greece and elsewhere.  In the US 
tobacco is grown in North Carolina. So who are we to tell Africans not to produce tobacco, which 
for some of these countries is their main export earner?  So I tried to stop that policy change.  There 
were three Africans on the board of the Bank.  I was stunned that none of them dared speak out to 
say in the Board they agreed with me, especially bearing in mind that they effectively had nothing to 
lose. The President of the World Bank does not appoint board members: they are elected or 
appointed by the countries they represent. While African bank staff understandably may have had 
difficulties speaking out, the African Board Members should not have been similarly shackled.   
 
In summary, therefore, on the trade issue, greater care should be taken to factor-in the cause of 
development into international trade deliberations.  Rich countries should in turn put greater effort 
in working domestic public opinion - through formal education and other campaigns - to explain the 
importance of incorporating development in the domestic political economy. Trade is more 
important than aid, and it would be so helpful if once in a while Africans would speak up and add 
their voice. 
 
KMD, ACBF: Do you think that might change in future? 
 
Ms. Herfkens: I hope it is actually changing.  I was very inspired by NEPAD at the time of its 
inception.  In fact, I stated in that same speech in Johannesburg in 2002, that:  
 
“We need the African voice in our debate. Let me tell you a story [of withdrawing Dutch doctors 
from Ghana]. It shows the interests that are at stake in our own societies. The obstacles are huge for 
development ministers who try to do the right thing. We cannot do so, unless you help us. Help us 
overcome the vested interests in our own societies. Help us fight aid fatigue by showing concrete results. 
Help us deal with parliaments that rightly want to see outcomes” 
 
The credibility of the African Union on some of these issues has not really improved, as you know.  
But a collective voice should make it easier.  I would hope South Africa speaks up more publicly.  It 
would also help if President Thabo Mbeki, in the context of G8 gatherings, speaks out more 
emphatically at public conferences, not only about the African view of the G8 delivery on Glenn 
Eagles commitments —which has been zero in actual fact —but also on the central importance of 
trade issues for sustainable African development.  
 
KMD, ACBF: So are you saying there are no African leaders that have a voice on the international 
stage when it comes to changing western public opinion on development? 
 
Ms. Herfkens: President Museveni of Uganda made that point in several speeches over the last few 
years, stating that “we do not need aid, let us start trading”.  There are a few African leaders who 
have distinguished themselves in that regard.  African Finance Ministers could be much more vocal 
about the quality of aid, advocating changes in donor behavior.  Some of the African participants in 
these first two “Big Tables” continued to speak out and I think that is important.  But there should 
be more and it should be consistent.  I would like to hear the former president of Tanzania 
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Benjamin William Mkapa on these issues for instance. He is well known across the globe for his 
integrity and his effective leadership in economic reform. He has tremendous credibility, and is now 
free to speak out. I wish he would more often make speeches and talk about these issues, traveling 
to this part of the world or to Europe.   
 
KMD, ACBF:  I think again there's still a little of that biting the hand that feeds you reticence.  
 
Ms. Herfkens: As Benjamin William Mkapa is a former president, how is Tanzania going to be 
punished for what he says?   
 
KMD, ACBF: Maybe some people would think he used to be President, and maybe he still speaks 
for the country. 
 
Ms. Herfkens: If you are being fed bad stuff all the time, how long are you going to swallow it before 
you say enough is enough, particularly as there are other hands around? It is not that I want Africans 
to say things that none of us is saying.  Some people in the North want to do the right thing, and are 
being blamed for apparently knowing better than Africans themselves, because Africans are not 
speaking out.  We are not asking Africans to say things that there is no resonance about.  Just put a 
little bit of your weight in the balance of the public debate. 
 
KMD, ACBF:  So you're saying, help us to help you? 
 
Ms. Herfkens: South Africa is not dependent on ODA, so should be Nigeria; they could do a little bit 
more.   
 
KMD, ACBF: Going back to this idea of aid, should African countries - more generally, developing 
countries - be competing for aid from non-traditional donors? 
 
Ms. Herfkens:  I find it very hard to make a judgment about new emerging donors like China. I come 
from a part of the world where we used wrong models for aid delivery, for several decades - which 
undermines our case were we to tell these up-and-coming donors to now join our recent new 
invention, the Paris Declaration. However, I just hope that the new emerging donors will see it in 
their interest to make aid work and not make the type of mistakes we made for 50 years, leading to 
excessive losses. And again if Africans shape up, if domestic accountability is improved, that by itself 
would limit the chance of other donors on the horizon doing the wrong thing.   
 
KMD, ACBF: And even the new donors from the East (China, India) have often failed when it 
comes to trade with Africa, take Lesotho as a case-in-point. These Asian tigers came to Lesotho to 
invest in the textile industry and take advantage of Lesotho’s preferential trade access to the USA.  
Life was good as long as it lasted.  For when the rules on international trade changed - as China 
acceded to the WTO and was granted most-favored-nation status to the lucrative US market - these 
investors relocated their capital literally overnight, leaving Lesotho in the lurch.  What advice would 
you give to African countries regarding how they should strategically engage these new donors and 
trade partners?  
 
Ms. Herfkens:  Well, I would say, reflect very seriously on the experience you had with the traditional 
donors and what went wrong there, and what stinks there.  Apply lessons learned to any donor.  
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And one of the lessons learned to me is, please start to say “no”. Africans could unilaterally put an 
end to tied aid and foster other best practices, if they just would say no.  And there is nothing to fear 
much here, as tied aid has reduced to such a small percentage that it should be possible to extinguish 
it totally if Africans start saying no.  Admittedly, the same is not true for tied technical assistance, 
which is still widespread.  But again Africans should evaluate what is brought to them.   
 
KMD, ACBF: Back to the MDGs, in some of your writings and in many reports we see that many 
African countries are not on track to meeting many of the goals by 2015.  Can you give us some 
success stories, countries we can look at and say this part is working for them, maybe we should 
extrapolate it and use lessons learned from those countries to help other countries reach these goals?  
 
Ms. Herfkens: The interesting observation is that countries which posted success stories are the same 
countries where aid works more generally, and are therefore the same countries that benefit from 
the implementation of the Paris Declaration, budget support etc.  Ghana is going to achieve the 
poverty goal next year, which is incredible.  Ten countries at least are on track to achieving the 
education goal; and Mozambique is on track to achieving the child mortality and the infant mortality 
goals in addition.  Tanzania is on track on most of the goals; while Mali and Burkina Faso are on 
target to meeting several of the goals; and Senegal is expected to secure the eighth goal.  So there are 
a lot of success stories.  By the way, many of these countries are not just African countries, they 
stand out from among the Least Developed Countries.  
 
The essence of these success stories is that this is where the ‘Global Deal’ was implemented—that is, 
developing countries assuming their responsibilities; and rich countries enhancing the volume and 
effectiveness of aid.  These African countries took their responsibilities to reform, improve their 
policies and public financial management, fight corruption, and take ownership.  And these 
countries thus benefited from fairly generous aid, which was delivered according to the Paris 
Declaration principles, with donors respecting domestic ownership of priorities and programs; 
accepting that they had to align their money to recipients’ priorities, harmonizing in many ways 
including by giving budget support, itself being the ultimate way of harmonizing and alignment. It is 
also instructive to note that, these are also some of the countries that benefited from debt relief.  We 
tend not to mention this any more because it is sort of done and over with. 
  
What this proves to me is that if both parties live up to their promises, i.e. the recipient and donor 
governments, we can achieve the goals.  Not much of a secret to the success stories, and in speeches 
I often quote this wonderful song about New York: "If you can make it there you can make it 
everywhere”.  Likewise, if you can achieve the goals in some of the poorest countries in Africa you 
can achieve them anywhere. But it really takes living up to the promise of governments on both 
sides.  
  
KMD, ACBF: In the 30-odd years spanning your service in the government, at the UN, and at the 
World Bank, as a woman you have been paving the way for others, one of the first in many cases, 
where you taken seriously by your male colleagues?  How hard was it? 
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Ms. Herfkens:   
 
Gender and Leadership 
 
It was hard, fortunately less so in the Netherlands for female politicians. When I became a member 
of parliament we were one out of ten, but by the time I left we were more that one out of three, 
which means that the participation of women in public life had improved quite markedly.  However, 
at that time I was also very young — I was 29 when I was elected the first time — and I suffered at 
that time more from ageism than of sexism.  That changed a bit when I went to the World Bank in 
1990. I was also the youngest there among the members of the board, but the real problem for me 
was that I was the only woman.  I was the only woman on the board and there were no women 
among senior management.  In this annual photograph taken of the 24 board members and the top 
50 managers in the Bank, I was the only woman in that whole environment.    
 
I tended to be identified purely only with gender issues. Of course, I felt that I had to fight for 
gender issues: that was necessary, it still is, but at the time it was particularly necessary.  But very 
often I would make serious statements in discussions of finance or trade, yet people would only 
identify me as the woman who has always been promoting gender issues.  You know, you just felt 
you were not listened to at the time.  It was really, really hard. 
 
KMD, ACBF: Has it changed? 
 
Ms. Herfkens: Within the United Nations, there are women, but I think it is still very much male 
dominated and they don't like strong women, so to speak.  But it is changing.  For something that is 
so deeply embedded in our DNA and in our cultures, I think the gender issue has been an incredible 
success story, because actually within a generation we are moving. I remember Mexico, the first UN 
conference on women in the 1970s. African governments were making statements that they didn't 
accept Western feminism to export alien values to their country.  But now you cannot go to a 
conference without hearing African presidents recognizing the role of women in their countries, 
even if it is only lip service from some of them.  The fact that this has changed in 30 years is in itself 
quite incredible.  So I am actually fairly positive about what we have achieved.  It was hard for me, 
but I must say it was incredibly motivating to be acknowledged as a role model. You visit these 
villages in Africa or Yemen and see the little girl in the school recognizing that, “I am a woman too”.  
So women can do it.  After making speeches, I often get comments or letters regularly from young 
women in the audiences who want to follow my example. And while I was serving on the board of 
the World Bank, a young professional in one of the Executive Director’s office jotted me a little 
note saying that, “My country would never have sent a woman if you had not pestered the boss to send 
women in your office here”.   These experiences are very inspiring.    
 
Africa Must Build Its Capacity 
 
Relating to this issue of technical assistance and the wasting of aid money, let me mention the billion 
dollars of grant money spent annually in Africa on technical assistance. These massive injections of 
old-style technical assistance have failed. Resident expatriate staff are trying in vain to superimpose 
institutions and concepts on the existing social and political fabric, norms and values.  In the 
meantime, this practice is undermining institutional capacity, perpetuating aid dependency and 
destroying local people's motivation to take charge of their own futures.  
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There is one thing that I think is really crucial for effective governance in Africa, and that is national 
development plans or poverty reduction strategies should address, at their core, the crosscutting 
issue of capacity building.  Indeed, it is recipient countries’ capacity building strategies that should 
guide development assistance, particularly in the field of technical assistance. Technical assistance 
will only deliver results if it is truly demand driven and a part of a homegrown holistic capacity 
building strategy.  This is absolutely crucial for the sustainability of capacity building in Africa.  The 
traditional donor’s attitude in the face of capacity problems is just to open a can of expatriate experts 
and throw them at random at the problem.  These experts often just simply undertake the 
assignment and leave. Their knowledge might not have been relevant in the first place, because they 
are not building on local knowledge, local needs and priorities etc.  It is not sustainable.  So at the 
heart of every national development framework there should be the capacity building strategy, across 
the Ministries, with priorities set allowing only truly demand-driven forms of expatriate support.  I 
think that is crucial.   
 
Being on the Recipient Side Shaped my Views 
 
Let me say a little bit about what shaped my own views.  It was when I was at the World Bank 
representing not only my own country but 12 countries, several of which were aid recipients, 
including Armenia, Georgia, and some of the Balkans.  And thus as their representative I was sitting 
on their side when they were negotiating with the World Bank and during the consultative group 
with all their donors.  And it really was an eye-opener to me how it felt to be on the recipient side, 
how conditionalities did not seem to touch on the real issues, and were irrelevant or impossible vis-
à-vis the domestic political economy.  And the absolutely chaotic aid architecture one had to deal 
with, with all the different donors, with all the different hobbyhorses, and with all their inconsistent 
conditionalities.  I remember a consultative group on a recipient, during which the World Bank had 
put as a condition for its adjustment loans that the recipient should not invest further in nuclear 
energy, while at the same meeting, Canada was proudly offering the expertise to build yet another 
plant.  This type of contradictory position is often very common.  It was really an eye-opener. 
 
The second eye-opener came when I was Development Cooperation Minister in the Netherlands. 
The first place I went to was Mozambique.  The Netherlands had been spending some 60-odd 
million Euros every year in Mozambique. So I met with the officials of the Finance Ministry - by 
then Luísa Dias Diogo was not the Minister yet, maybe the number two or three - and nobody in the 
Finance Ministry had a clue where that 60-million Euros was being spent on.  We were just spending 
it left and right, in regions, for the University, with some sector Ministry but we never even 
informed the Finance Ministry.  How could the schools or whatever we were building be 
sustainable?  I found this just incredible, how a fairly decent and functioning government would not 
have any oversight on how the huge amounts of aid money at stake were actually used.   
 
Part of what we had done was in the environmental sector; conserving the environment has been a 
staying political priority of the Netherlands. So we had actually built the environmental Ministry (in 
Mozambique), staffed it, provided equipment, which included fax machines and computers.  When I 
met the Environment Minister, I asked: “you have got this wonderful building and all your staff, 
what are your priorities now?”  To this he responded: “what do you think they should be?” This 
effectively made the point: “was it not you who wanted this, so now tell us what we should be doing?”  
This I also found incredible.  This experience motivated the mantra in my later work, namely, 
ownership, and responsibility of the recipient for setting priorities and financial management. In 
other words, I grew to advocate the importance of overall governance and policies on the recipient 
side and the irrelevance and lack of sustainability of individual donors adopting a little town, village 
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or even a whole province.  In other words, I spoke about the futility of erecting a little paradise in an 
ocean of misery and then flaunting the apparent success of our little project.  But on withdrawal, the 
little paradise would collapse back in the ocean with nothing to show for it two years later. Billions 
of aid have been wasted like this, and I resolved that I would not be a party to such malpractice 
anymore.  
 
One more example to illustrate the intrinsic lack of sustainability of projects, as opposed to 
influencing the overall policies of the recipient government by co-funding them, was, again, in 
Ghana.  There, I met the Finance Minister and was sensitizing him about our readiness to give 
budget support to the health ministry, money that we had saved by withdrawing the Dutch Doctors 
as mentioned earlier.  I brought up another subject in that conversation, which was that, at that time 
in Ghana malaria bed nets were attracting the highest value-added tax (VAT).  They were really 
therefore very expensive.  This, I thought was not a good idea.  So I tried to explain to the Finance 
Minister that abolishing this tax on bed nets would constitute an important public-health investment 
in Ghana.  To allay his fears of lost tax revenues, the Dutch government would increase its already 
substantial budget support to the health ministry.  So he did, but it was a bit of a joke because he 
was claiming higher losses in tax revenues than what I felt was actually the case, but we ended up 
great friends.   
 
Years later at an international conference, I ran into officials from Ghana's Finance Ministry who on 
identifying me said, "You are the malaria bed-net woman."  I was no longer a Minister and I was 
there as a less important person.  They called out to me, insisting, "You have to meet the Minister.  
We so often still talk about you and about the influence of that one meeting!"  They took me to the 
VIP corner where I did not belong any more and the Minister said warmly: “It is so good to see you 
again”.  He remarked that, the conversation we had years back had turned out to be very important 
to him, because it did make him think about these issues with the result that they were now socially 
marketing the bed nets.  Alas, my successor in the Netherlands actually reversed this and went back 
to the “Dutch” projects, and ended up providing bed nets.  Still, in terms of constructive donor 
influence, this anecdote serves as a lucid example of how budget support allows the type of 
conversation to ensure affordable bed nets all over the country, instead of a little project where the 
donor could only hand out a few.    
 
 
Concluding Summary 
 
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that: 
 
 Aid that undermines recipient's capacity and sense of ownership of policies and programs 
cannot support sustainable growth. It perpetuates dependence. 
 African countries, leaders and professionals are not speaking out enough in support of aid 
reforms. Their reticence weakens efforts by development cooperation ministers in donor 
countries who stand against vested interests that are paid out of ODA budget, and who seek 
reform to aid delivery mechanisms. 
 Billions of dollars are still spent on expatriate staff and their perquisites. African governments 
should learn to say "No" to supply-driven and tied aid.  They should also say "No" when doing 
business with a particular donor is just too costly.  
 Governments, policies and institutions must work in Africa and citizens should be capacitated to 
hold their governments accountable for results.  This is the essence of democracy. Capacity of 
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parliaments and civil society organizations needs to be stepped up to promote accountability by 
the governments. This for long will remain a vital area for intervention in capacity building. 
 Mutual accountability between donor and recipient countries should be encouraged and the 
existing platform or mechanism strengthened. 
 The Doha Development Agenda on trade is not delivering results. Distortions in trade in 
agriculture are still a major challenge. Until rich countries open up their markets and reform their 
agricultural policies, success in achieving MDG 1 on poverty and hunger in African countries 
will remain a mirage. Rich countries' agricultural subsidies are an unfair trade practice. They are 
crowding out African farmers and destroying the livelihoods of small producers. 
 African countries should strive to earn their external resources on the international market than 
endure endless lectures by World Bank and IMF officials as well by Development Cooperation 
Ministers from rich countries. Many African governments are still too focused on maximizing 
aid than trade opportunities. 
 African governments are not speaking out loud and hard enough on trade issues. Trade is more 
important than aid. Poor countries still have very weak capacity for trade negotiations. This is a 
critical area for intervention in capacity building. For instance, not enough negotiations have 
gone into the Economic Partnership Agreements. These Agreements in the African context 
should: 
 
o Yield to intra-African integration.  
o Abstain from pushing Singapore or WTO-plus issues, which have the effect of creating 
burdensome obligations and distracting from or leading to inconsistency with 
development priorities. 
o Not demand reciprocity, as there are attendant trade-adjustment costs to African 
countries, which need attention.  Instead, the EU should grant real and tangible market 
access to African countries by dealing with non-trade barriers (NTBs), including granting 
more flexibility on rules-of-origin and inordinately burdensome health and 
environmental standards.    
 
But then, African countries should speak up and defend their own interests. It will be recalled 
that the Council of European Trade and Development Ministers met in the fall of 2007 with 
their African counterparts. At least two European Development Ministers took to task the Trade 
Commissioner, expressing doubt about the development impact of the EPAs.  Not one African 
stood up and said, "I agree with the Dutch and the Italians on their observations on the EPAs." 
They just kept silent.  It is extremely difficult then as a rich country’s Development Cooperation 
Minister to take issues with the European Trade Commissioner who would wonder whether we 
know African interests better than Africans themselves.  This has been a recurrent experience 
for me, not only in the field of trade, but also in other spheres of development efforts.   
 
 African Finance Ministers should be more vocal about the quality of aid, and should relentlessly 
advocate changes in donor behaviour.  
 African leaders like the former president of Tanzania, Benjamin William Mkapa, who is known 
all over as a person with enormous credibility and integrity, and who possess a record of 
effective leadership in economic reforms should continue to speak out on trade issues, poor 
performance by the G8, especially on Glenn Eagles commitments on which nothing has been 
delivered, and the quality of aid, among other issues. 
 In speaking out in support of the efforts by some Development Cooperation Ministers who are 
doing the right thing in the area of trade and aid reforms, countries such as South Africa (that is 
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not dependent on aid) and Nigeria (that should not) need to do a lot more on behalf of the 
continent. 
 There are a lot of success stories on progress by African countries in the achievement of some 
of the MDGs. Ghana is on track to achieving the poverty goal; 10 countries have shown strong 
indications in achieving the education goal; Mozambique has made substantial progress on the 
infant mortality goal; Tanzania has progressed on most of the goals; Burkina Faso and Mali are 
on target to meeting a number of other goals, while Senegal is expected to secure the eighth 
goal. There are other promising cases as well. 
 Africa countries must continue to invest in the building of capacity. The massive injection of 
billions of dollars in the old-fashioned technical assistance in Africa has failed to deliver 
development results. Technical assistance programs are not built on local knowledge and 
development priorities. This is undermining human and institutional capacity, perpetuating aid 
dependence and destroying people's motivation to take charge of their own futures.  
 Development assistance should be driven and guided by recipient's development priorities and 
capacity building strategies. Development assistance that does not have a clear path to 
sustainable capacity building and growth is of little or no value. To this, Africans must say "No". 
 
Thus, in all, Africa must take charge of its development, push for trade and aid reforms and 
continue to invest in the development of its own capacity. 
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